NEW SANCTIONS FOR A NEW CENTURY:
TREASURY’S INNOVATIVE USE OF FINANCIAL
SANCTIONS
ORDE F. KITTRIE*
1. INTRODUCTION
From a sanctions perspective, the first decade of the 21st
Century has been dominated by two principal factors: a return by
the Security Council to very near its pre-Cold War deadlock, and
the search for a “targeted sanction” which will achieve decisive
coercive pressure on international wrongdoers while imposing no
or minimal collateral damage.1 While the Holy Grail of a perfect
targeted sanction has yet to be found and may unfortunately be
unachievable, the new century’s closest approximation of such a
Grail is almost certainly the novel breed of financial sanctions
designed and implemented since 2005 by the U.S. Department of
the Treasury.
Although this novel breed of financial sanctions was designed
and first implemented under the administration of George W.
Bush, the Obama Administration has already cast a vote of
confidence in it by making the extraordinary decision to retain in
place Stuart Levey, the Bush-appointed Under Secretary of the
Treasury, who is principally known as the leading architect of
these financial sanctions. The decision to retain Levey is both a
vote of confidence in this novel breed of financial sanctions and an
indication that their design is likely to have a strong influence on

* Orde F. Kittrie is a Professor of Law at Arizona State University. Prior to
entering academia, he served for eleven years at the United States Department of
State, including as a specialist on sanctions and on nuclear nonproliferation.
1 See David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Introduction: Assessing Smart
Sanctions: Lessons from the 1990s, in SMART SANCTIONS: TARGETING ECONOMIC
STATECRAFT 1, 2 (David Cortright & George A. Lopez eds., 2002) (describing the
characteristics of a smart sanctions policy).
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any Obama Administration efforts to increase the range and
impact of sanctions on Iran or other rogue states.2
This Article will analyze the motivation, design,
implementation, impact, and future prospects for this new breed of
financial sanctions. The Article will also identify and analyze
several innovative aspects of these sanctions that seem highly
likely to be replicated in the design of a wide range of future
sanctions against other targets. The most sophisticated and
widespread implementation of these sanctions thus far has been
against Iran, and so it is Treasury’s use against Iran on which this
Article will focus, while also periodically referencing their
implementation against North Korea, their other principal target
thus far.
2.

MOTIVATION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL
SANCTIONS

2.1. Historical Background
During the 1990s, the economic sanctions imposed by the
international community reached both a peak in power and a
trough in popularity. The first half of that decade saw the highest
number of worldwide sanctions episodes since World War II.3 In
particular, the United Nations Security Council, which had
imposed mandatory economic sanctions on only two targets
between 1945 and 1990, imposed economic sanctions on nine target
states and comprehensive sanctions on Iraq (1990), the former
Yugoslavia (1992), and Haiti (1994) between 1990 and 1995.
Two of these Security Council sanctions regimes—those on
Libya and Iraq—addressed proliferation challenges similar to those
posed by Iran and North Korea. In both the Libyan and the Iraqi
case, sanctions contributed to stopping the progress of the rogue
state’s nuclear weapons program.4 The strong (although less-than2 See, e.g., Paul Richter, Bush Official Involved With Iran Sanctions Stays, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at A6 (“The Obama administration has decided to retain the
official who led the Bush administration's effort to squeeze Iran with economic
sanctions, providing an important clue on how it intends to approach the Islamic
Republic.”).
3 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 18 tbl.1.1
(3d ed. 2007).
4 Id. at 12–13.
Readers interested in a more detailed discussion of the
contribution of sanctions to stopping the Libyan and Iraqi nuclear weapons
programs may wish to refer to Orde F. Kittrie, Averting Catastrophe: Why the
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comprehensive) sanctions imposed by the Security Council on
Libya in 1992 and 1993 induced Libya’s government, “a regime
that had become synonymous with international terrorism,”5 to
forsake terrorism and completely and verifiably relinquish its
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs. Libya ceased
its support for terrorism following the Security Council’s
imposition on it of strong sanctions in 1992 and 1993.6 In exchange
for removal of the Security Council sanctions, Libya, in August
2003, formally accepted responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103 and paid $2.7 billion in compensation.7 Furthermore,
Libya announced on December 19, 2003 that it had decided “to get
rid of [weapons of mass destruction (“WMD”)] materials,
equipment and programs, and to become totally free of
internationally banned weapons.”8 Libya proceeded to allow a
team of British and American government experts to enter the
country and completely dismantle Libya’s WMD infrastructure by
April 2004.9
In the meantime, the comprehensive sanctions on Iraq achieved
their objective of halting Saddam Hussein’s progress toward a
nuclear arsenal. However, this accomplishment became clear only
after (and was overshadowed by) the Coalition occupation of Iraq
in 2003. While the Iraq sanctions were in place, and since then,
there has been a widespread perception that comprehensive
sanctions on Iraq hurt innocent Iraqis while not commensurately
advancing the purposes for which the sanctions had been imposed.
This perception, combined with the impact on Security Council
decision-making of increased U.S.-Russia tensions, has contributed
to the Council, in the fourteen years since 1994, never again
imposing comprehensive economic sanctions.
The Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs are currently
further along than the Iraqi and Libyan nuclear programs ever
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is Losing its Deterrence Capacity and How to Restore It,
28 MICH J. INT’L L. 337, 400, 406 (2007), from which this discussion is adapted.
5 Stephen D. Collins, Dissuading State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions?
(An Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed Against Libya), 27 STUD. CONFLICT &
TERRORISM 1, 16 (2004).
6 Id. at 2, 5, 13–15.
7 Felicity Barringer, Libya Admits Culpability in Crash of Pan Am Plane, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2003, at A6.
8 Libyan Call Against Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2003, at A10 (citing text of the
Libyan government statement).
9 Judith Miller, Gadhafi’s Leap of Faith, WALL ST. J., May 17, 2006, at A18.
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were. However, the sanctions imposed on Iran and North Korea
by the international community thus far are much weaker than the
sanctions which stopped the Iraqi and Libyan nuclear weapons
programs.10 Indeed, both the Iran and the North Korea sanctions
are thus far weaker than those the Security Council had previously
imposed in response to many lesser threats to international peace
and security. For example, both sets of sanctions are weaker than
those imposed on Liberia and Cote D’Ivoire during their civil wars,
Sierra Leone in response to its May 1997 military coup, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991–93 during the Bosnian crisis, and
Haiti in response to its 1991 military coup. Several factors have
contributed to the weakness of the sanctions on Iran and North
Korea—including a Security Council more and more deadlocked
as a result of Russia-U.S. tensions, the dismal reputation sanctions
acquired during their use against Iraq, and the growing
unwillingness of the increasingly profit-oriented Russian and
Chinese governments to sacrifice short-term profits for the longterm benefits (such as stopping proliferation) that sanctions are
intended to achieve. As a result, the sanctions imposed by the
Security Council on Iran and North Korea have been too weak to
coerce either into giving up, or to contain either’s ability to
advance, its nuclear program.
Faced with the apparent impossibility of getting strong
sanctions through the U.N. Security Council, the relatively weak
commitment to nonproliferation sanctions of key European and
other allied governments, and the relative paucity of trade between
the United States and Iran (most such trade is prohibited by U.S.
law), American opponents of Iran’s nuclear program have in recent
years creatively used law in three key initiatives to step up the
economic pressure on Iran. These three initiatives are an effort to
divest state and local government pensions from certain companies
doing business with Iran,11 an effort to pressure companies

10 Readers interested in a more detailed analysis of the U.N. Security Council
sanctions imposed in response to the Iranian and North Korean nuclear
programs—including comparison of those sanctions with other Security Council
sanctions and a thorough analysis of the factors contributing to their weakness—
may wish to see Kittrie, supra note 4, at 371–91, 423–25, from which this discussion
is adapted.
11 See, e.g., Julie Kosterlitz, Squeezing Iran, NAT’L J., Sept. 1, 2007, at 22, 22–29
(discussing a grassroots campaign advocating divestment of state and local
government pensions from companies doing business with Iran).
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supplying gasoline to Iran into halting those sales,12 and the
Treasury Department’s new breed of financial sanctions. Each of
these initiatives seeks to persuade specific third-country companies
to stop doing business with the targeted rogue state (Iran),
including by putting those third-country companies to a choice
between the U.S. market and that of the rogue state.
The most sophisticated and impactful of these innovative
sanctions initiatives has thus far been the Treasury Department’s
deployment of financial sanctions to increase U.S. leverage over
Iranian decision-making and to counter Iran’s use of the
international financial system to achieve its nuclear objectives and
finance terrorism. While similar financial sanctions have been
used against North Korea, their use against Iran has been more
highly developed and wide-ranging (in part because Iran has a
much broader and deeper set of relationships with the
international financial system), and so it is their use against Iran on
which this Article will focus, while also periodically referencing
their implementation against North Korea.
2.2. Nature of the Iranian Challenge
Iran currently poses two major challenges to the international
community: (1) Iran is persisting with its nuclear program, in
violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803;13 and
(2) Iran is the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism, providing
training, weapons, and hundreds of millions of dollars a year in
funding to support various terrorist groups.

12 See, e.g., Nevin John, RIL Gives in to US Pressure, Stops Gasoline to Iran, BUS.
STANDARD, Jan. 7, 2009, http://www.business-standard.com/india/news
/ril-gives-in-to-us-pressure-stops-gasoline-to-iran/17/36/345499/
(describing
pressure exerted on Reliance Industries, an Indian company, to stop selling
gasoline to Iran); Asjylyn Loder, Business with Iran May Mean None in Florida, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at 1A (describing Florida State Senator Ted
Deutch’s efforts to pressure Swiss company Vitol to stop selling gasoline to Iran).
13 Readers interested in a more detailed analysis of the challenges posed by
Iran’s nuclear program, and of that program’s violation of international law, may
wish to refer to Kittrie, supra note 4, at 344–45, 379–91 and Iran CounterProliferation Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 970 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 110th Cong.
(2008)
(statement
of
Professor
Orde
F.
Kittrie),
available
at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2008test/040808oktest.pdf, from
both of which this discussion is adapted.
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Iran’s Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons raises four major concerns.
First, the Iranian government is already the world’s leading state
sponsor of terrorism.14 An Iranian nuclear arsenal could serve Iran
as a “nuclear umbrella,” making countries victimized by Iraniansponsored terrorism even more reluctant to retaliate against Iran.
This could make Iran an even more self-confident sponsor of
terrorism.
Second, an Iranian nuclear arsenal could spur proliferation by
its neighbors. The fear that an Iranian nuclear arsenal will unleash
a cascade of proliferation across the Middle East has been
heightened by at least twelve Arab states in the last two-and-a-half
years announcing plans to pursue nuclear technology.15 An
editorial in the Egyptian government daily newspaper Al-Ahram
put it as follows: “Iran’s nuclear capability . . . will spur many
powers in the region to develop a nuclear program.”16 Such a
cascade of proliferation in the Middle East would likely lead to the
worldwide collapse of the already tottering nuclear nonproliferation treaty (“NPT”) regime.17 In addition, the proliferation
14 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2007, at 172 (2008), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/105904.pdf
[hereinafter
COUNTRY REPORTS] (stating that in 2007 “Iran remained the most active state
sponsor of terrorism”).
15 See, e.g., William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Fearing Iran, Arab States Seek
Nuclear Power, INT’L HERALD TRIB., April 15, 2007, http://www.iht.com
/articles/2007/04/15/news/nuke.php; Richard Beeston, Six Arab States Join Rush
to Go Nuclear, TIMES (London), Nov. 4, 2006, at 1; INT’L INS. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES,
NUCLEAR PROGRAMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: IN THE SHADOW OF IRAN 7 (2008), available
at http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/nuclear-programmes-in
-the-middle-east-in-the-shadow-of-iran/read-the-dossier/.
16 Hanna Avraham, Middle East Media Research Inst., Arab Media Reactions to
Iran’s Nuclear Project, INQUIRY & ANALYSIS, May 23, 2006, http://memri.org/bin
/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA27706; see also Roee Nahmias,
Mubarak
Hints:
We’ll
Develop
Nukes,
YNETNEWS,
Jan.
5,
2007,
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3348600,00.html (reporting that
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has hinted that if Iran proceeds to attain
nuclear weapons, Egypt will follow suit).
17 The U.N. Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change warned of “the erosion and possible collapse of the whole [nuclear
nonproliferation] Treaty regime,” explaining: “[w]e are approaching a point at
which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and
result in a cascade of proliferation.” High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges &
Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶¶ 109–11, U.N. Doc.
A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
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of nuclear weapons in the Middle East tinderbox, with its border
disputes, religious fanaticism, ethnic hatreds, unstable
governments, terrorist groups, and tendency for conflicts to spiral
out of control, seems likely to result in a devastating nuclear war.
Some have also raised a third set of concerns: that while
mutual deterrence kept the United States and the Soviet Union
from attacking each other during the Cold War, significant
elements of Iran’s leadership may, by virtue of their apocalyptic
messianism and exaltation of martyrdom, be impossible to deter
from using nuclear weapons.
The fourth major concern raised in response to Iran’s pursuit of
nuclear weapons is that, even if the top echelon of the Iranian
government turns out to be deterrable, there would be a
considerable risk of rogue elements within Iran taking it upon
themselves to transfer nuclear arms to Iran’s terrorist allies. As
was seen with Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan, who proliferated under the
comparatively secular and responsible Musharraf government, one
key rogue figure can be sufficient to share an insecure country’s
nuclear technology with others.18
2.2.2.

Iran’s Sponsorship of Terrorism

Another significant challenge is Iran’s provision of funding,
training, and weapons to terrorist groups including Hamas,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, an organization that has
killed more Americans than any terrorist network other than al
Qaeda.19 Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism for decades,20 currently

See, e.g., GORDON CORERA, SHOPPING FOR BOMBS: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION,
GLOBAL INSECURITY, AND THE RISE AND FALL OF THE A.Q. KHAN NETWORK (2006).
Readers interested in an overview of the challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear
program, and of that program’s violation of international law, that is more
detailed than that provided in this Article may wish to refer to Kittrie, supra note
4, at 344–45, 379–91 and Iran Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 970
Before the S. Fin. Comm., 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Professor Orde F.
Kittrie), available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2008test
/040808oktest.pdf, from both of which this discussion is adapted.
19 See, e.g., COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 14, at 172; Between Feckless and
Reckless: U.S. Policy Options to Prevent a Nuclear Iran: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Middle East and South Asia, and the Subcomm. on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation and Trade of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 24 (2008)
[hereinafter Glaser Statement] (statement of Daniel Glaser, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury),
available at http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/41849.pdf.
18
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spends hundreds of millions of dollars each year to fund
terrorism.21
2.2.3.

Iran’s Use of the International Financial System to
Accomplish Its Nuclear and Terrorism Sponsorship
Objectives

Iran utilizes the international financial system to accomplish
both its nuclear and its terrorism sponsorship objectives. Iran’s
integration into the international financial system both provides
the Iranian government with the global financial capability to
support its nuclear and terrorism sponsorship activities and
exposes elements of the international financial system to a risk of
facilitating these activities. In order to avoid suspicion and
minimize the risk of detection, Iran’s state-owned banks and other
entities use an array of deceptive practices when using their global
financial ties to advance Iran’s nuclear program and sponsorship of
terrorism.
For example, Iran uses front companies and
intermediaries to surreptitiously obtain technology and materials
for its nuclear and missile programs from countries that would
prohibit such exports to Iran.22
In addition, Iranian banks ask other financial institutions to
remove the Iranian banks’ names when processing their
transactions through the international financial system.23 The goal
is to allow Iranian banks to remain undetected as they move
money through the international financial system to pay for the
Iranian government’s nuclear and missile related purchases and to
fund terrorism.24 The name-removal tactic is intended to evade the
controls put in place by responsible financial institutions further
down the line and has the effect of potentially involving those
institutions in transactions that are illegal, that place their
reputations at risk, and that they would never engage in if they
knew who was really involved.25 Iran’s reliance on deceptive
20 See, e.g., Orde F. Kittrie, Emboldened by Impunity: The History and
Consequences of Failure to Enforce Iranian Violations of International Law, 57 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 519 (2007) (providing a history of Iran’s sponsorship of terrorist activities).
21 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 27.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks by Treasury Sec’y
Paulson on Targeted Fin. Measures to Protect Our Nat’l Sec. (June 14, 2007)
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financial transactions to support its nuclear and terrorism
sponsorship activities has contributed to its unwillingness to meet
international standards for the development and implementation
of laws and enforcement capabilities that would allow it to detect
and prevent money laundering or terrorist financing.26
3.

THE NEW BREED OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS: IMPACTFUL
INNOVATION

The U.S. government has in recent years adopted a remarkably
impactful and exceptionally innovative multifaceted strategy for
countering Iran’s use of financial transactions to support its nuclear
and terrorism sponsorship activities.
This strategy has
significantly complicated Iran’s use of financial transactions for
these purposes. Even more importantly, the strong impact on
Iran’s economy of the financial pressure created by this strategy
has provided U.S. policymakers with perhaps their greatest current
source of leverage over Iran.
3.1. Impact
In response to the new breed of U.S. government financial
sanctions on Iran, more than eighty banks around the world,
including “[m]ost of the world’s top financial institutions,”27 have
curtailed business with Iran.28 Some leading financial institutions
have dramatically scaled back their Iran-related business, while
others have halted it entirely.29 The withdrawal of major global
banks from the Iranian market has disrupted key Iranian trading
relationships, including those in the energy sector.30 As a result of
[hereinafter Paulson Remarks], available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases
/hp457.htm.
26 See Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 28 (“Iran uses its global financial ties
to pursue both the threat of terrorism and nuclear program through an array of
deceptive practices specifically designed to avoid suspicion and evade detection
from the international financial community.”).
27 Paulson Remarks, supra note 25.
28 See Robin Wright, Stuart Levey’s War, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 2, 2008, at 29,
31 (noting that “[s]o far, more than 80 banks have curtailed business with Iran”
including several prominent European and Middle Eastern banks).
29 See Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 34 (“Many leading financial
institutions have either scaled back dramatically or even terminated their Iranrelated business entirely.”).
30 See Bank Jitters Hit Iran Fuel Imports, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, Feb. 2008, at 28
(concluding that due to U.S.-led sanctions “Iran is starting to feel the effect of
international sanctions on its domestic energy sector”); Paul Sampson, Iran:
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the financial sanctions, it has reportedly become almost impossible
in Europe to arrange for transactions involving Iranian companies
utilizing a letter of credit, the standard payment guarantee used in
international trade.31 For example, Reliance Industries, an Indian
company, was forced to halt its gasoline sales to Iran for several
months because it could no longer arrange from French banks the
letters of credit on which the transactions had depended.32 The
sanctions have also affected Iran’s ability to finance petroleum
development projects, with Iran’s Oil Minister admitting that
“overseas banks and financiers have decreased their cooperation”
on such projects.33 Overall, the financial sanctions have reportedly
increased the cost of imports to Iran by some twenty to thirty
percent.34
Also, as a result of the financial sanctions, the number of
foreign banks with branches in Iran dropped from forty-six to
twenty between 2006 and 2008.35 Meanwhile, the financial
sanctions have reportedly contributed to seventeen of Iran’s state
and privately owned banks “struggling with credit shortages
which have brought them close to insolvency.”36
Products in Flux, ENERGY COMPASS, Feb. 8, 2008, at 1 (stating that due to the “USled squeeze on Iran” many financial institutions have ceased to provide credit to
Iranian companies); Mark Trevelyan, More Companies Suspend Business with Iran,
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 17, 2008, at 15 (discussing the effects of sanctions on
“Iran’s oil-based economy”).
31 See Trevelyan, supra note 30, at 15 (quoting a senior German banking and
finance consultant as stating that “[i]t is today impossible more or less in Europe,
with a couple of exceptions, to get a letter of credit” for trade with Iran).
32 See id. (“Late last year, the Indian oil refiner Reliance halted sales of
gasoline and diesel to Tehran after the French banks BNP Paribas and the Calyon
unit of Crédit Agricole stopped offering letters of credit . . . .”).
33 Robin Wright, Iran Feels Pinch as Major Banks Curtail Business: U.S.
Campaign Urges Firms to Cut Ties, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2007, at A10 (quoting
Iranian Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh).
34 See David Blair, Banks Recruited to Wage Financial War on Teheran, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 18, 2007, at 17 (“One Teheran newspaper recently
reported that Iranian companies had seen their import costs rise by 20 or 30 per
cent because they had to employ middlemen to evade financial restrictions.”).
35 Steven R. Weisman, World Group Tells Banks to Beware Deals with Iran, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, at A10 (citing an American diplomat as noting a drop in the
foreign bank branches operating in Iran).
36 The Iranian Economy Is Imploding, 71 APS REVIEW DOWNSTREAM TRENDS, Dec.
15, 2008, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/economy-economic-indicators
/economic-conditions-inflation/11731056-1.html; see also The Party’s Over: Iran’s
President Ahmadinejad Has Had a Good Run. For How Much Longer?, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 22, 2008, at 59 (noting that the President of Iran’s banking policies have
pushed many lenders “to the brink of insolvency”).
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In November 2008, sixty leading Iranian economists called in
an open letter for the regime to drastically change course, saying
that Iran’s “‘tension-creating’ foreign policy has ‘scared off foreign
investment and inflicted heavy damage’ on the economy.”37 The
economists said the current sanctions have cost Iran “many billions
of dollars” by forcing a “large part” of its imports and exports to be
“carried out through middlemen.”38
3.2. Innovations
The U.S. government’s multifaceted financial sanctions strategy
against Iran includes several innovations that seem likely to impact
the design of future sanctions against other targets.39 These
innovations include: direct outreach to individual foreign private
financial institutions, aggressive use of financial authorities to
pursue political goals, and effective development and harnessing
of intelligence about global financial transactions.

37 Borzou Daragahi, Economists in Iran Criticize Ahmadinejad, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
10, 2008, at A3.
38 Sixty Iranian Economists Write Open Letter to President, BBC MONITORING
WORLDWIDE, Nov. 14, 2008, at 3.
39 The financial measures against Iran were inspired at least in part by the
Treasury Department’s prior success in using similar financial measures against
North Korea. In September 2005, the Treasury Department, acting under section
311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5318A (2006), cited Macau-based Banco
Delta Asia as a “primary money laundering concern” for its financial interactions
with North Korea. Imposition of Special Measure Against Banco Delta Asia
SARL, 70 Fed. Reg. 52,217, 55,219 (Sept. 20, 2005). As a result, many international
private financial institutions cut or reduced their ties to North Korea, and the
Macau government took over Banco Delta Asia and froze over $24 million dollars
in North Korean funds. Michael Jacobson, Sanctions Against Iran: A Promising
Struggle, 31 WASH. Q. 69, 72 (2008); Steven R. Weisman, The Ripples of Punishing
One Bank, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2007, at C1 (stating that Macau froze $25 million of
North Korean assets held by fifty-two different holders). Although the amount of
money at stake was small, the designation of Banco Delta Asia, in combination
with the designation of several North Korean entities as primary money
laundering concerns has resulted in “North Korea’s virtual isolation from the
global financial system.” Paulson Remarks, supra note 25. This halt in North
Korea’s access to the international financial system provided very important
leverage for the United States in its negotiations with North Korea over the latter’s
nuclear program. See Jacobson, supra note 39, at 73 (stating that financial
measures had a “considerable impact” on negotiations with the North Koreans).
The North Korean effort drew lessons from earlier, somewhat analogous
programs aimed at Colombian narcotics traffickers. See Paulson Remarks, supra
note 25 (“We have drawn on lessons learned from earlier programs aimed at
Colombian drug cartels.”).
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In developing and implementing its multifaceted financial
sanctions strategy, the United States has used the U.N. Security
Council where possible, but has also found a way to work outside
of it. To maximize its effectiveness operating outside of the
Security Council, the United States has worked to persuade not
only individual foreign governments but also individual nonAmerican companies to join the effort. Bringing such nonAmerican companies on board was “a particularly daunting
challenge given the limits of U.S. jurisdiction over foreign
entities.”40 However, once private sector financial institutions are
on board, they are “able to act much more quickly than
governments who often lack the necessary authority or the political
will to take action on their own”41 or may face cumbersome
bureaucratic procedures for exercising whatever relevant authority
they do have. The strategy’s approach to bringing such nonAmerican companies on board, and its success in doing so—both
described in more detail in Section 4.3 of this Article—have been
one of the strategy’s most significant innovations.
Another of the strategy’s most innovative aspects is its use of
the U.S. Treasury Department’s financial authorities to pursue
political goals. “It is certainly a very new and effective tool,” said
Robert Einhorn, the State Department’s former Assistant Secretary
for Nonproliferation.42 “Years ago, people at State would go to
Treasury and say, ‘We’ve got a lot of financial muscle, we should
use it to pursue political goals.’ But Treasury would always say it
didn’t want to mess around with the international financial
system.”43 Indicative of Treasury’s novel approach is Bush
Administration Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s statement that
he and his finance ministry counterparts around the world have a
“responsibility” to “broaden our role beyond economic
stewardship and become valuable contributors to help ensure our
countries’ and our citizens’ security.”44 James Wilkinson, chief of
staff of the Bush Administration Treasury Department, noted that,
“[o]ur financial tools are sometimes the most powerful weapons
Jacobson, supra note 39, at 71.
Paulson Remarks, supra note 25.
42 Bay Fang, Treasury Wields Financial Sanctions: U.S. Strategy Straddles the Line
Between Diplomacy, Military Might, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 23, 2007, at C1.
43 Id. (quoting Robert Einhorn, Former Assistant Sec’y of State for Nonproliferation).
44 Paulson Remarks, supra note 25.
40
41
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our government has to help change behavior.”45 In the past,
sanctions have focused largely on leveraging international trade in
goods, for example through the use of trade embargoes.
Treasury’s newfound willingness to use its financial muscle to
pursue political goals is particularly and increasingly important
because “[g]lobal financial flows are growing rapidly and greatly
exceed the trade in goods and services.”46
The United States’ new financial sanctions have been impactful
in part because Treasury has effectively developed and harnessed
intelligence about global financial transactions. In an era of
globalization, such intelligence is increasingly available, because
“technology and integration have made it more difficult for anyone
using the financial system to hide.”47 In order to be useful for
purposes of these sanctions, the intelligence must be accurate.48 It
also must be shareable, in a way that traditional intelligence, which
depends heavily on sources and methods that are themselves
secret, is often not.
Fortuitously, transactions using the
international financial system “typically leave a trail of detailed
information . . . [o]pening an account or initiating a funds transfer
requires a name, an address, a phone number” that is collected and
stored by a financial institution.49 Such information can be used to
identify key actors and their networks.50 In 2004, the U.S. Treasury
Department became the world’s first finance ministry to develop
in-house expertise in the collection and analysis of such
information.51
One might expect that rogue actors eager to avoid detection
would avoid the formal financial system and rely instead on
moving money using such methods as hawala that can be
effectuated without the creation of official financial records.
However, Treasury has found that for rogue actors there is
sometimes “no good alternative and, in many cases, no alternative

Weisman, supra note 39.
Paulson Remarks, supra note 25.
47 Id.
48 As Treasury Secretary Paulson has stated: “[t]o identify and act against
threats, we need specific, current, and reliable intelligence.” Id.
49 Id.
50 See id. (“Treasury then evaluates this information with an eye towards
potential action—be it a designation, an advisory to the private sector, or a
conversation to alert other finance ministers to a particular threat or bad actor.”).
51 Id.
45
46
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at all” to the formal international financial system.52 Proliferation
networks turn out to require letters of credit and other types of
financing for many of their purchases.53
Those otherwise
legitimate businessmen or manufacturers who participate in a
proliferation transaction because of profit, rather than ideology,
may find it harder to turn a blind eye or may be otherwise
discomfited by a transaction that avoids the formal financial
system.
Rogue states turn out to depend on the global financial system
for such functions as holding reserves and financing both their
revenue-earning exports and their imports of such strategic
commodities as gasoline.54 Even terrorist networks still sometimes
attempt to move funds through the international financial system,
such as when they find the alternatives to be even riskier or too
cumbersome.55 While individual terrorist attacks have been shown
to be relatively inexpensive to carry out, “global terrorist groups
need large sums of money to pay operatives, to recruit and train
members, to acquire false documents and travel.”56
Intelligence about specific financial transactions has proven
important to the financial sanctions’ success because it has enabled
Treasury to present the sanctions as “specifically targeted against
those individuals or entities engaging in illicit conduct.”57 Bush
Administration Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said that as a
result of the U.S. government’s effective development and
harnessing of intelligence about global financial transactions,
“[r]ather than grudgingly complying with, or even trying to evade
our sanctions, we have seen the banking industry in particular
voluntarily go above and beyond their legal requirements because
they do not want to do business with terrorist supporters, money
launderers or proliferators.”58
As a result of these innovations, Treasury’s new financial
sanctions have proven an exception to the traditional reputation of
Id.
Id.
54 Thus when Iran could no longer make use of French bank letters of credit
for financing its purchases of gasoline from India’s Reliance Industries; Reliance
for a time stopped its exports of gasoline to Iran.
55 Paulson Remarks, supra note 25.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
52
53
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sanctions as ineffective in putting pressure on rogue regimes,
harmful to innocent persons, riddled with cheating by private
businesses that evade sanctions while their governments turn a
blind eye, or all three.59
In sharp contrast to the traditional reputation of sanctions, at
least some foreign banks have gone even beyond the letter of the
law in implementing the financial sanctions. In addition, the
financial sanctions have clearly had a significant impact on the
Iranian economy, costing the Iranian government funds that might
otherwise have gone towards furthering its nuclear ambitions or
supporting terrorism.
However, it is important to note that as of February 2009, there
was no sign that the financial sanctions have succeeded in coercing
the Iranian government into halting either its nuclear program or
its support for terrorism. In part as a result, the two major party
Presidential candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain, called
during the campaign for increasing sanctions pressure on Iran if it
persists in illicit activity.60 The implication of both candidates’
Id.
For example, on June 4, 2008, Senator Obama said at a speech in
Washington, D.C.:
59
60

We will pursue this diplomacy with no illusions about the Iranian
regime. Instead, we will present a clear choice: If you abandon your
dangerous nuclear program, your support for terror, and your threats to
Israel, there will be meaningful incentives, including the lifting of
sanctions and political and economic integration with the international
community. If you refuse, we will ratchet up the pressure . . . [w]e
should work with Europe, Japan, and the gulf states to find every avenue
outside the United Nations to isolate the Iranian regime, from cutting off
loan guarantees and expanding financial sanctions, to banning the export
of refined petroleum to Iran, to boycotting firms associated with the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard, who[se] Quds Forces have rightly been
labeled a terrorist organization.
Senator Barack Obama, Remarks at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee
Annual
Conference
(June
4,
2008)
(transcript
available
at
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/04
/AR2008060401325.html). On June 2, 2008, Senator McCain said the following in
a speech in Washington, DC:
[W]e must create the real-world pressures that will peacefully but
decisively change the path they [Iran] are on. Essential to this strategy is
the U.N. Security Council, which should impose progressively tougher
political and economic sanctions. Should the Security Council continue
to delay in this responsibility, the United States must lead like-minded
countries in imposing multilateral sanctions outside the U.N. framework.
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positions seemed to be that there is a tipping point at which
economic pressures and protests could convince the regime that its
“tension-creating” foreign policy poses too great a risk to its grip
over the Iranian people, but that the financial sanctions, as efficient
and impactful as they have been, have been insufficiently powerful
to reach that tipping point.
The Obama Administration’s
extraordinary decision to retain in place Stuart Levey, the Bushappointed Under Secretary of the Treasury who has been the
principal architect of the financial sanctions,61 is a vote of
confidence in the financial sanctions and an indication that their
design will have a strong influence on any Obama Administration
efforts to increase the range and impact of sanctions on Iran.
4. DELINEATION OF THE U.S. STRATEGY FOR COMBATING IRAN’S
MISUSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND
APPLYING FINANCIAL PRESSURE TO IRAN
The U.S. government’s overall strategy for combating Iran’s
misuse of the international financial system and for applying
financial pressure to Iran consists of the following three
interrelated initiatives: (1) direct imposition by the United States of
unilateral financial sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear and terrorism
sponsorship activities; (2) promoting financial measures against
Iran by key international organizations and foreign governments;
and (3) direct outreach to key foreign financial institutions.
4.1. Direct Imposition by the United States of Unilateral Financial
Sanctions Targeting Iran’s Nuclear and Terrorism Sponsorship
Activities
The United States has had wide-ranging sanctions in place on
Iran since shortly after the November 4, 1979 seizure by Iran of
American diplomats at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.62 However,
the U.S. strategy for countering Iran’s use of financial transactions
to support its nuclear and terrorism sponsorship activities and for
applying financial pressure to Iran relies heavily on two relatively
recent Executive Orders.
Senator John McCain, Speech on the Middle East (June 2, 2008) (transcript
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/16395/).
61 Wright, supra note 28 (discussing Under Secretary Levey’s campaign to
promote financial sanctions).
62 KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IRAN: U.S. CONCERNS AND
POLICY RESPONSES 49 (2008).
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4.1.1.

Executive Order 13382

Executive Order 13382 of June 28, 200563 provides for freezing
(blocking) the assets of designated persons engaged in
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (and their means of
delivery) and their support networks.
Designations under
Executive Order 13382 prohibit all transactions between the
designees and any U.S. person, and freeze any assets the designees
may have under U.S. jurisdiction. Executive Order 13382 initially
applied to eight organizations in North Korea, Iran, and Syria.
However, the Executive Order provides that Treasury and State
Departments may designate additional WMD proliferators and
their supporters, and they have designated dozens of additional
individuals and entities in the last several years,64 including over
63 Exec. Order No. 13,382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38,567 (July 1, 2005). In the chapeau of
Executive Order 13382, the President specified that he was acting under the
authority vested in him “as President by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code.” Id. 3 U.S.C. §
301 is the President’s general authorization to delegate functions to subordinate
officials and 50 U.S.C. § 1601 addresses the termination of existing declared
emergencies. The key statutory authority for Executive Order 13382 is IEEPA, a
little-known statute which provides the President with extraordinarily powerful
authorities “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares
a national emergency with respect to such threat.” International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707 (2006). Once the President has
declared such a national emergency, he may pursuant to IEEPA prohibit the
following with respect to “any person, or with respect to any property, subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States”: “transfers of credit or payments between,
by, through, or to any banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or
payments involve any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof.” 50
U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(A)(ii). Once such a national emergency has been declared, the
President may also pursuant to IEEPA block, “nullify, void, prevent or prohibit,
any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation,
importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or
privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with
respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 50 U.S.C.
§ 1702(a)(1)(B).
64 See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T. TREASURY, WHAT YOU
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT TREASURY RESTRICTIONS (Jan. 16, 2009) available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/wmd/wmd.pdf
(explaining that Executive Order 13382 authorized “Treasury, together with the
Department of State” to “designate additional WMD proliferators and their
supporters” and providing a list of such entities that have been blocked under this
authority).
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Iranian entities
fifty Iran-related individuals and entities.65
designated for their direct involvement in production of weapons
of mass destruction and their delivery systems include the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran, Iran’s Aerospace Industries
Organization, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),
and Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics.66
The U.S. government has also designated under Executive
Order 13382 several state-owned Iranian banks, including Bank
Sepah, Bank Melli, and Bank Mellat. Bank Sepah was designated
in January 2007 for “provid[ing] a variety of critical financial
services to Iran’s missile industry,” including “facilitat[ing] Iran’s
international purchases of sensitive material for its missile
program” through “its role as a financial conduit.”67 Bank Melli,
Iran’s largest bank, was designated in October 2007 for providing a
range of “banking services to entities involved in Iran’s nuclear
and ballistic missile programs, including entities listed by the U.N.
for their involvement in those programs.”68 Bank Melli “facilitated
numerous purchases of sensitive materials for Iran’s nuclear and
In the process of “handling financial
missile programs.”69
transactions on behalf of the IRGC, Bank Melli . . . employed
deceptive banking practices,” such as requesting that its name be
removed from financial transactions, to hide its involvement from
the international banking system.70 Bank Mellat was designated in
October 2007 for “provid[ing] banking services in support of Iran’s
65 See Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 19 (noting that the “Departments of
State and Treasury announced the designation of dozens of entities and
individuals” in 2007).
66 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Designation of
Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for
Terrorism (Oct. 25, 2007), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases
/hp644.htm. The designation of the IRGC, which explicitly included a list of
companies owned or controlled by the IRGC and its leaders, has a particularly
strong impact on the Iranian economy because, as Treasury noted, the “IRGC has
significant political and economic power in Iran, with ties to companies
controlling billions of dollars in business and construction and a growing
presence in Iran’s financial and commercial sectors.” Id. “The IRGC,” Treasury
noted, “is involved in a diverse array of activities, including petroleum
production and major construction projects across the country.” Id.
67 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Iran’s Bank Sepah Designated by
Treasury: Sepah Facilitating Iran’s Weapons Program (Jan. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp219.htm.
68 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 66.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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nuclear entities” and “facilitat[ing] the movement of millions of
dollars for Iran’s nuclear program.”71
4.1.2.

Executive Order 13224

Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, authorizes the
Treasury Department to designate, and block the assets of, foreign
persons determined “to have committed, or to pose a significant
risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of
U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy
of the United States.”72 In addition, the order authorizes Treasury
to block the assets of persons that provide support, services, or
Id.
Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001). In the chapeau
of Executive Order 13224, President Bush specified that he was acting under the
authority vested in him as President “by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as
amended (22 U.S.C. 287c) (UNPA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
and in view of United Nations Security Council Resolution[s]” 1214, 1267, 1333,
and 1363. Id. IEEPA, the National Emergencies Act, and 3 U.S.C. § 301 are
discussed as part of the analysis of Executive Order 13382. See supra note 63 and
accompanying text. Section 5 of the UNPA, which the President cited in
Executive Order 13224, but not Executive Order 13382, provides in relevant part
as follows:
71
72

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, whenever the United
States is called upon by the Security Council to apply measures which
said Council has decided, pursuant to article 41 of said Charter, are to be
employed to give effect to its decisions under said Charter, the President
may, to the extent necessary to apply such measures, through any
agency which he may designate, and under such orders, rules, and
regulations as may be prescribed by him, investigate, regulate, or
prohibit, in whole or in part, economic relations or rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication between any
foreign country or any national thereof or any person therein and the
United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or
involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
22 U.S.C. § 287c (2006). The four Security Council Resolutions listed in the
chapeau of Executive Order 13224 all focus on the Taliban. However, the
designation authority that Treasury draws from the UNPA through Executive
Order 13224 is not limited to application of measures required by those four
particular, Taliban-oriented Security Council Resolutions. In light of that, while
IEEPA is clearly the foundational statutory authority for designation under
Executive Order 13224 of Iranian entities for their support of terrorist groups, the
UNPA also provides important statutory authority in those cases where
Treasury’s designation is helping to implement measures required by the Security
Council pursuant to article 41 of the U.N. Charter.
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assistance to, or are “otherwise associated with” terrorists and
terrorist organizations designated under the Order.73
In October 2007, Treasury designated under Executive Order
13224 the Qods Force branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps for “provid[ing] material support to the Taliban, Lebanese
Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front
In
for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.”74
designating the Qods Force under Executive Order 13224, Treasury
noted that the “Qods Force provides weapons and financial
support to the Taliban to support anti-U.S. and anti-Coalition
activity in Afghanistan” in contravention of legally-binding
Security Council Resolutions.75 Treasury also noted that the Qods
Force operates training camps for Hizballah, “provides roughly
$100 to $200 million in funding a year to Hizballah and has assisted
Hizballah in rearming in violation of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1701.”76 The State Department has elsewhere stated
that the Qods Force provides:
Iraqi militants with Iranian-produced advanced rockets,
sniper rifles, automatic weapons, mortars that have killed
thousands of Coalition and Iraqi Forces, and explosively
formed projectiles (EFPs) that have a higher lethality rate
than other types of improvised explosive devices (IEDs),
and are specially designed to defeat armored vehicles used
by Coalition Forces.77
Treasury has also designated under Executive Order 13224
Iran’s state-owned Bank Saderat.78 Bank Saderat was designated in
October 2007 for being “used by the Government of Iran to channel
funds to terrorist organizations, including Hizballah and EUdesignated terrorist groups Hamas, PFLP-GC, and Palestinian
Islamic Jihad.”79 In designating Bank Saderat, Treasury noted that
“from 2001 to 2006, Bank Saderat transferred $50 million from the

Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079, 49,080 (Sept. 23, 2001).
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 66.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 14, at 173.
78 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 66 (designating
Bank Saderat, its branches, and its subsidiaries as supporters of terrorism under
Executive Order 13224).
79 Id.
73
74
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Central Bank of Iran through its subsidiary in London to its branch
in Beirut for the benefit of Hizballah fronts in Lebanon that support
acts of violence,” that Hamas has “had substantial assets deposited
in Bank Saderat,” and that “in the past year, Bank Saderat has
transferred several million dollars to Hamas.”80
4.2. Promoting Financial Measures Against Iran by Key International
Organizations and Foreign Countries
Recognizing that sanctions, including those in the financial
arena, are almost always more effective when they are multilateral,
the U.S. government’s initiative to combat Iran’s misuse of the
international financial system and to apply financial pressure on
Iran has placed considerable emphasis on promoting financial
measures against Iran by key international organizations and
foreign countries. These efforts have focused on: (1) including
financial components in U.N. Security Council Resolutions
addressing Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and (2) working
within the multinational Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
4.2.1.

Financial Components in U.N. Security Council Resolutions
Addressing Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs

As of February 2009, the three principal United Nations
Security Council Resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran in
response to its nuclear program are Resolution 1737 of December
23, 2006,81 Resolution 1747 of March 24, 2007,82 and Resolution 1803
of March 3, 2008.83 These resolutions contain three principal types
of financial components: (1) financial sanctions targeting specified
key actors associated with Iranian nuclear and missile programs,
(2) requirements that member states prohibit certain financial
activities relating to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, and (3) a
call on member states to exercise vigilance over the activities of
financial institutions in their territories with all Iranian financial
institutions.

80
81
82
83

Id.
S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006).
S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007).
S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008).
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Financial Sanctions Targeting Specified Key Actors
Associated With Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Programs

Paragraph 12 of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 requires
all member states to freeze any assets on their territories that are
owned or controlled by persons or entities designated by the
Security Council or the implementing Committee as “being
engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of
nuclear weapon delivery systems.”84 Paragraph 12 also requires
member states to “ensure that any funds, financial assets or
economic resources are prevented from being made available by
their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories,
to or for the benefit of” designated persons and entities.85
Resolution 1737 designated ten entities and twelve individuals.86
By doing so, Resolution 1737 required all member states to freeze
the designees’ assets and effectively deny them access to the
international financial system.
Three months later, Resolution 1747 added thirteen additional
entities and fifteen additional individuals to the list of designees
subject to paragraph 12 of Resolution 1737.87 Alongside various
military, research, and manufacturing entities and individuals, the
list of designees in Resolution 1747 included Bank Sepah, Bank
Sepah International, and Ahmad Derakhshandeh, the Chairman
and Managing Director of Bank Sepah.88 The Iranian and
international banking community were thus put on notice that
even the relatively cautious United Nations Security Council is
willing to put bankers who finance proliferation in the same
category of sanctions targets as the military officers, research
scientists, and manufacturers who directly handle nuclear
components and missile delivery systems.
Eleven months after the passage of Resolution 1747, Resolution
1803 added twelve more entities and thirteen more individuals to
the list of designees subject to paragraph 12 of Resolution 1737.89
Since several of the designees under Resolutions 1737, 1747, and
84
85
86
87
88
89

S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 81, ¶ 12.
Id.
Id. Annex.
S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 82, ¶ 4, Annex I.
Id. Annex I.
S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 83, ¶ 7, Annexes I, III.
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1803 had previously been publicly designated by the U.S.
government under Executive Order 13382, the three Security
Council Resolutions had the effect of multilateralizing aspects of
Treasury’s unilateral actions against Iran’s proliferation
infrastructure.90 For example, Bank Sepah was designated by
Treasury under Executive Order 13382 in January 2007 and then by
the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 1747 of March
2007.
4.2.1.2.

Requirements that Member States Prohibit Certain
Financial Activities Relating to Iran’s Nuclear and
Missile Programs

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 also requires all member
states to “prevent the provision to Iran” of any “financial
assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer
of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale,
transfer, manufacture or use” of certain specified items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology associated with Iran’s nuclear
and missile programs.91 This “effectively prohibits the provision of
financial services that would allow Iran to procure the prohibited
items needed for nuclear or missile programs.”92
4.2.1.3.

Call To Exercise Vigilance Over Activities With All
Iranian Financial Institutions

In addition to imposing sanctions on proliferation-related
entities and individuals, and requiring member states to prohibit
financial activity directly related to Iran’s nuclear and missile
programs, the Security Council’s Iran resolutions recognized the
role that a broad range of interactions between the international
financial community and a potentially proliferating state can play
in facilitating, hindering, encouraging, or discouraging
proliferation. Resolution 1747 got the ball rolling by calling upon
“all states and international financial institutions not to enter into
new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional

90 See Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 29–31 (noting that several Iranian
financial institutions have been sanctioned both by Executive Order 13382 and
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803).
91 S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 81, ¶ 6.
92 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 33.
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loans, to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for
humanitarian and developmental purposes.”93
Resolution 1803 goes further. In paragraph nine, it:
[c]alls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering into
new commitments for public provided financial support for
trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits,
guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities
involved in such trade, in order to avoid such financial
support contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear
activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon
delivery systems . . . .94
This provision is important because even some of the United
States’ closest allies, including France, Germany, and Italy, had
been providing their companies with export loan guarantees to
encourage and facilitate trade with Iran.95 A partial result is that
the EU has been Iran’s largest trading partner, accounting for more
than a third of Iran’s trade with the world.96
Of particular importance for purposes of Treasury’s financial
sanctions strategy, Resolution 1803, in paragraph ten:
[c]alls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the
activities of financial institutions in their territories with all
banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and
Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad,
in order to avoid such activities contributing to the
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems . . . .97
As signaled by the “calls upon” formulation with which all
three of these provisions begin, none of them is legally binding.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury has nevertheless deemed the
“all banks domiciled in Iran” provision contained in paragraph 10
S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 82, ¶ 7.
S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 83, ¶ 9 (emphasis omitted).
95 See Jacobson, supra note 39, at 70 (noting the EU’s extensive ties to Iran
where France, Italy, and Germany each encourage exports to Iran through
“extensive export credit guarantees”).
96 See Neil King, Jr. & Marc Champion, Embargo Politics: Nations’ Rich Trade
with Iran is Hurdle for Sanctions Plan, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2006, at A1 (discussing
the extent of trade between Europe and Iran and its implications for proposed
sanctions).
97 S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 83, ¶ 10 (emphasis omitted).
93
94
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of Resolution 1803 to be of
“critical importance,” as it
“significantly reinforces the concerns Treasury has expressed for
many months regarding some Iranian financial institutions’
deceptive financial conduct and terrorism and proliferation
support activities.”98
4.2.2.

Working Within the Financial Action Task Force

The Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) is an intergovernmental body dedicated to developing and promoting
policies, both at national and international levels, “to combat
money laundering and terrorist financing.”99 The FATF currently
has thirty-four members, including the five permanent members of
the United Nations Security Council, the European Commission,
Italy, and Japan.100 The FATF is the premier inter-governmental
body setting standards for anti-money laundering (“AML”) and
combating financing of terrorism (“CFT”) policies and laws. The
FATF’s AML/CFT standards have been endorsed by the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations
and are recognized by more than 175 countries.101
In addition to setting AML/CFT standards, the FATF also
identifies jurisdictions with serious vulnerabilities in their
AML/CFT legal frameworks. In October 2007, the FATF issued a
public statement stating its concern that Iran’s “lack of a
comprehensive anti-money laundering/combating the financing of
terrorism (AML/CFT) regime represents a significant vulnerability
within the international financial system.”102 FATF noted that its
“members are advising their financial institutions to take the risk
arising from the deficiencies in Iran’s AML/CFT regime into
account for enhanced due diligence.”103 Iran thereafter adopted an
AML law.104 However, the FATF concluded that Iran’s AML/CFT
98
99

2009).

Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 33.
Financial Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org (last visited Mar. 1,

100 See FATF Members & Observers, http://www.fatf-gafi.org (follow
“About the FATF” hyperlink; then follow “Members & Observers” hyperlink)
(last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (providing a list of current members and observers of
FATF).
101 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 32.
102 Fin. Action Task Force [FATF], FATF Statement on Iran (Oct. 11, 2007),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/1/2/39481684.pdf.
103 Id.
104 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 28.
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regime remained deficient and issued statements of concern about
Iran in both February 2008 and October 2008.105
The October 2008 FATF statement noted Iran’s steps towards
remedying its AML deficiencies, and urged Iran to “address the
remaining weaknesses.” In this October 2008 statement, the FATF
expressed particular concern that Iran’s “lack . . . of effort” to
“address the risk of terrorist financing continues to pose a serious
threat to the integrity of the international financial system” and
declared that “[u]rgent action to address this vulnerability is
necessary.”106 The FATF called on its members, and urged all
jurisdictions, to “strengthen preventive measures to protect their
financial sectors from this risk.”107 In response to these warnings,
many major economic powers have warned their financial
institutions that choosing to do business with Iran entails
significant risks.108
FATF is also playing a role in promoting effective
implementation of the financial measures contained in Security
Council resolutions targeting Iran. For example, the FATF issued
guidance in June 2007,109 September 2007,110 and October 2007111 on
implementation of these measures.
This FATF work was
recognized in Security Council Resolution 1803, which welcomed
the guidance issued by FATF to assist states in implementing the
obligations created by these provisions.112
105 FATF,
FATF Statement (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.fatf-gafi.org
/dataoecd/16/26/40181037.pdf; FATF, FATF Statement (Oct. 16, 2008),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/25/17/41508956.pdf.
106 FATF Statement (Oct. 16, 2008), supra note 105.
107 Id.
108 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 32.
109 FATF, Guidance Regarding the Implementation of Financial Provisions of
United Nations Security Council Resolutions to Counter the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (June 29, 2007), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd
/28/62/38902632.pdf. This June 2007 guidance addressed not only the financial
measures contained in Resolutions 1737 and 1747 regarding Iran but also the
financial measures contained in Resolutions 1695 and 1718 regarding North
Korea’s WMD and missile programs.
110 FATF, Annex: Financial Sanctions Against a Financial Institution
Designated Under United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to
Prevention of WMD Proliferation (Sept. 5, 2007), http://www.fatf-gafi.org
/dataoecd/23/16/39318680.pdf.
111 FATF, Guidance Regarding the Implementation of Activity-Based
Financial Prohibitions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (Oct.
12, 2007), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/43/17/39494050.pdf.
112 S.C. Res. 1803, supra note 83, ¶ 2.
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4.3. Outreach to Key Foreign Financial Institutions
From 2006 to the end of the Bush Administration, senior
Treasury Department officials engaged in an unprecedented
initiative of outreach to the international financial private sector,
“meeting with more than 40 banks worldwide to discuss the threat
Iran poses to the international financial system.”113 Through this
initiative, Treasury “shared information about Iran’s deceptive
financial behavior and raised awareness about the high financial
and reputational risk associated with doing business with Iran.”114
In response to this campaign, more than 80 banks around the
world, including “most of the world’s top financial institutions,”115
have curtailed business with Iran.116 Some leading financial
institutions have dramatically scaled back their Iran-related
business, while others have halted it entirely.117
Many financial institutions have responded to Treasury’s
outreach by cutting off Iranian business in dollars but not other
currencies.118 Some of Treasury’s financial measures against Iran
may thus contribute to undermining the dollar’s preeminence in
global financial markets, thereby rendering such measures less
impactful in the future.119 This is a significant concern, and strong
consideration should be given as to how to design future financial
sanctions to minimize their risk to the dollar’s primacy. However,
with Iran speeding towards nuclear weapons capability—a gravely
dangerous prospect—and Treasury’s financial measures
apparently the most effective existing peaceful means of increasing
U.S. leverage over Iran, deploying these measures now is likely
worth the risk.
Treasury officials attribute the success of their outreach efforts
to their emphasis on Iran being “demonstrably engaged” in illicit
financial conduct and the sensitivity of the international financial
Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 34.
Id.
115 Paulson Remarks, supra note 25.
116 See Wright, supra note 28, at 31 (noting that over eighty banks have ceased
doing business with Iran).
117 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 34.
118 Id.
119 As Bush Administration Treasury Secretary Paulson stated, “Treasury can
effectively use these tools largely because the U.S. is the key hub of the global
financial system” and that “maintaining this standing . . . makes our strategy
possible.” Paulson Remarks, supra note 25.
113
114
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private sector to reputational and business risk.120 In its outreach
to foreign governments and international private financial
institutions, Treasury has tried to emphasize that the issue is not
just “conduct that the U.S. doesn’t like politically, but conduct
that’s contrary to international law or international standards and
norms.”121
Treasury officials have also raised the prospect of business and
reputational risks posed by doing business with Iran. For example,
Bush Administration Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson
cautioned business executives that in light of Iran’s deceptive
financial practices, including its use of front companies, and since
“[t]he IRGC is so deeply entrenched in Iran’s economy and
commercial enterprises, it is increasingly likely that if you are
doing business with Iran, you are somehow doing business with
the IRGC.”122 For international private financial institutions, this is
reputationally daunting given the IRGC’s leading role in Iran’s
terrorism and proliferation activities,123 and legally daunting in
light of the Treasury Department’s designation of the IRGC under
Executive Order 13382 and the Security Council’s inclusion of three
designated IRGC entities and nine designated IRGC senior officials
on the list of designees with respect to which all states must freeze
assets and “ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic
resources are prevented from being made available by their
nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or
for the benefit of these persons and entities.”124
Stuart Levey, the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence under President Bush and now President Obama, has
also addressed the issue of reputational and business risk. Levy
notes that “[f]inancial institutions want to identify and avoid
dangerous or risky customers who could harm their reputations

120 See Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 34–35 (explaining the importance of
involving the private sector in aiding the enforcement of sanctions against
countries engaged in illicit conduct).
121 Fang, supra note 42, at C2. (quoting Adam Szubin, director of Treasury’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control).
122 Paulson Remarks, supra note 25.
123 Bush Administration Treasury Secretary Paulson accused the IRGC of
being “directly involved in the planning and support of terrorist acts.” Id.
124 S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 81, ¶ 12; see also S.C. Res. 1747, supra note 82, ¶ 4,
Annex I (reaffirming and applying the measure stated in S.C. Res. 1737, ¶ 12 to
the persons and entities in Annex I).
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and business.”125 Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel
Glaser concurs, stating that “[r]ather than comply with just the
letter of the law, we have seen many in the banking industry
voluntarily go beyond their legal requirements because they do not
want to handle illicit business.”126 Many banks around the world
now screen their customers against Treasury’s list of designees,
even when they are not required to do so by the laws of the
country in which the bank is domiciled.127 So cognizant are major
U.S. and foreign banks of the risks posed to them by the infiltration
of illicit money, that all of them now have offices dedicated to
protecting against such infiltration.128 Treasury’s designations
advise these offices of “who they need to protect against.”129
Although Treasury officials tend to downplay it, international
private financial institutions have also likely halted Iran-related
business in response to Treasury’s outreach because those
institutions are concerned that continuation of Iran-related
business could result in regulatory penalties such as fines or even
loss of access to the U.S. market. The size of the U.S. market, the
primacy of the dollar and of U.S. banks in the international
financial system, and the powerful impact on Banco Delta Asia
from Treasury’s mere threat to cut if off from the U.S. financial
system130 would presumably make many banks leery of putting
their access to the U.S. banking system at risk for the sake of
maintaining financial ties to terrorists or proliferators.
Periodic large fines have also sent a message to international
private financial institutions that there is a price to be paid for
being caught doing business with entities and individuals
designated as having links to terrorism and proliferation. For
example, in May 2004 the Federal Reserve fined UBS, Switzerland’s
largest bank, $100 million for sending U.S. dollars to Cuba, Iran,
Libya and Yugoslavia and intentionally hiding the transactions by
125 Minimizing Potential Threats from Iran: Assessing the Effectiveness of Current
US Sanctions on Iran: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence), available at http://banking.senate.gov
/public/_files/ACF44E2.pdf.
126 Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 35.
127 Paulson Remarks, supra note 25.
128 See id. (discussing the methods taken by reputable banks because they do
not want to be associated with terrorists and proliferators).
129 Id.
130 Id.
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filing false monthly reports to the Federal Reserve.131 In December
2005, ABN Amro Bank NV, a Dutch firm, was fined $80 million by
U.S. federal and state financial regulators for actions including
modification by its branch in Dubai of payment instructions on
wire transfers, letters of credit and checks issued by Iran’s Bank
Melli and a Libyan bank in order to hide their involvement in the
transactions and enable access to the U.S. banking system.132 As
one former Treasury official put it, the Treasury Department’s
success in persuading foreign banks to curtail transactions with
Iran is due in part to those banks’ eagerness “to avoid being the
‘next ABN AMRO.’”133
Most recently, in January 2009, Lloyds TSB Bank had to pay
$350 million in fines and forfeiture as a result of a scheme in which
Lloyds altered or “stripped” wire-transfer information to hide the
identities of Iranian and Sudanese clients in order to deceive
American financial institutions and enable the clients to access the
U.S. banking system.134 The stripping of wire-transfer information
“made it appear that the transactions originated at Lloyds TSB
Bank” in the United Kingdom rather than in the sanctioned
countries.135 Screening mechanisms at U.S. banks would have
raised an alarm if the actual source of the funds had been evident,
but coming from a respected British bank, the transfers were not
questioned.136 In some cases, the transferred funds “appear to have
purchased items within” the United States.137 In others, the funds
were being channeled through U.S. banks to foreign vendors

131

C17.

UBS Fined $100 Million Over Trading of Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2004, at

132 Paul Blustein, Dutch Bank Fined for Iran, Libya Transactions: $80 Million
Levied for Foreign Dealings, Money Laundering, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2005, at D1.
Treasury stated: “Between December 2001 and April 2004, ABN AMRO’s overseas
branches removed or revised references to entities in which the Governments of
Libya and Iran had an interest before forwarding wire transfers, letters of credit
and U.S. dollar checks to ABN AMRO branches in New York, NY and Chicago,
IL.” OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T. TREASURY, ENFORCEMENT
INFORMATION FOR JANUARY 3, 2006 (Jan. 3, 2006), available at http://www.treas.gov
/offices/enforcement/ofac/civpen/penalties/01032006.pdf.
133 Jacobson, supra note 39, at 73.
134 Chad Bray, Lloyds TSB Settles with U.S. Officials, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2009, at
B8.
135 Id.
136 Tehran’s Strip Club: How Lloyds Bank Helped Iran’s Global Shopping Spree,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2009, at A12.
137 Id.
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requesting payment in dollars.138 Lloyds admits to “stripping”
with respect to Iranian clients until 2004.139 As of the writing of
this article in January 2009, it was unclear whether Treasury’s
invigoration of Iran financial sanctions beginning in 2005 played
any role in causing Lloyds to refrain from restarting the wiretransfer information stripping it halted in 2004.
Whatever their motivations, once some international private
financial institutions decide to halt business with entities or
individuals of concern, “it becomes an even greater reputational
risk for others not to follow, and so they often do.”140 Such
voluntary private decisions in turn make it “even more palatable
for foreign governments to impose similar measures because their
financial institutions have already given up the business, thus
creating a mutually-reinforcing cycle of public and private
action.”141
Treasury’s financial measures are also seen as more palatable
because unlike sanctions of the past that targeted entire countries
and were criticized as harming innocent people, Treasury’s
measures are perceived as more targeted.142 In addition, Treasury
has imposed these financial sanctions in a graduated manner,
providing Iranian entities and individuals with “numerous
opportunities to alter their behavior before further measures are
imposed.”143 This has helped build international support for the
sanctions by demonstrating that “the purpose of such measures is
not simply to punish the Iranian regime, but also to encourage a
change in behavior.”144
5.

CONCLUSION

Treasury’s conduct-based, intelligence-grounded, targeted
financial sanctions have thus far proven to be among the twentyfirst century’s most effective and important new counterterrorism
and counterproliferation tools. The imposition of such sanctions
on Iran has resulted in more than eighty banks around the world,

138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id.
Bray, supra note 134.
Paulson Remarks, supra note 25.
Glaser Statement, supra note 19, at 35.
Fang, supra note 42, at C1.
Jacobson, supra note 39, at 74.
Id.
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including most of the world’s top financial institutions, curtailing
business with Iran; has disrupted key Iranian trading relationships;
and has decreased Iran’s ability to finance vital petroleum
development projects. As a result, in November 2008, sixty leading
Iranian economists called in an open letter for the regime to
drastically change course, saying that Iran’s “‘tension-creating’
foreign policy has ‘scared off foreign investment’"145 and cost the
Iranian economy “many billions of dollars.”146
The Treasury Department’s financial sanctions strategy against
Iran includes several innovations that seem highly likely to impact
the design of future sanctions against other targets. These include
direct outreach to individual foreign private financial institutions,
the aggressive use of financial authorities to pursue political goals,
and the effective development and harnessing of intelligence about
global financial transactions.
Treasury’s outreach to individual foreign private financial
institutions has persuaded many—including most of the world’s
top financial institutions—to take steps against Iran that go beyond
what is required of them by their home countries’ laws. Treasury
has found that its unprecedented direct outreach to a country’s key
private financial institutions can yield results much more quickly
than does outreach to that same country’s government, which can
lack political will or the necessary authority, or may face
cumbersome bureaucratic procedures for exercising whatever
relevant authorities it does have. Once some foreign private
financial institutions decide to halt business with entities or
individuals of concern, the reputational risk for others not to
follow is increased, and so they often do follow. Such private
sector decisions can in turn make it more politically feasible for
foreign governments to impose restrictions because the relevant
companies in their jurisdiction have already given up the business.
Globalization has inevitably increased the business interests in the
United States of many leading foreign companies, leaving them
subject to U.S. government regulation and leverage, and reliant on
the good will of the U.S. government and consumers. As a result,
major foreign companies in sectors beyond finance may also be
susceptible to direct outreach by the U.S. government.

Daragahi, supra note 37.
Sixty Iranian Economists Write Open Letter to President, BBC WORLDWIDE
MONITORING, Nov. 14, 2008, at 3.
145
146
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Another of the financial sanctions strategy’s innovations is the
U.S. Treasury Department’s newfound willingness to use its
financial authorities to pursue political goals. Because global
financial flows are increasing rapidly and already exceed the
worldwide trade in goods and services, Treasury’s willingness to
use its financial muscle to pursue political goals is going to become
increasingly important. This financial muscle seems likely to be
applied to additional targets. It will likely also be applied in new
ways, as experience, creativity and changes in the financial markets
and regulatory regimes lead Treasury to enhance and refine the
initial set of financial sanctions tools discussed in this article.
A third innovative element of the financial sanctions has been
Treasury’s exceptionally effective development and use of
intelligence about global financial transactions. The availability of
such intelligence has been enhanced by the advance of technology,
the increasing integration born of globalization, and most
governments’ more rigorous regulation of financial transactions as
a result of U.S. advocacy at FATF and the U.N. following the
September 11 attacks. Technological advances (including the
internet and mobile telecommunications) and increasing
integration have likely increased the potential transparency of
other transnational activities, such as travel and communications.
It may be tempting for the U.S. government to enhance its
harnessing of intelligence from such activities.
The Obama Administration may decide to try to replicate in
other sectors the innovative willingness to use financial sector
economic and regulatory muscle to pursue political goals and the
Treasury Department’s novel tactic of direct outreach to individual
foreign private financial institutions. If so, foreign companies in
exceptionally globalized, strategic, regulated, and information-rich
sectors such as mobile telecommunications, the Internet, aviation,
and energy could be next in line.
Before the Obama
Administration takes such steps, however, it should analyze and
weigh very carefully both the risk posed by such measures to U.S.
economic and regulatory preeminence in those sectors and the risk
that such steps might set problematic precedents that could be
used against the United States by current or future adversaries.147
147 For example, the United States depends heavily on Chinese purchases of
American debt, a dependence which provides China with significant leverage
over the United States. See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, China Losing Taste for Debt From
the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2009, at A1.
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Any such moves into additional sectors should be designed with
an eye to minimizing those risks.
In the meantime, there is considerable potential for the
application of Treasury’s initial set of financial sanctions tools to
additional security challenges and to greater worldwide effect. In
order for this potential to be achieved, many more nations must (1)
adequately outlaw terrorist and proliferation finance and money
laundering, and (2) implement laws giving their finance ministries
the authority to effectively access and use intelligence and quickly
impose sanctions against the financing of terrorism and
proliferation. Several key U.S. allies have yet to adequately outlaw
money laundering and terrorist finance, and even more countries
have yet to develop the authorities and capabilities necessary to
apply targeted financial measures to any terrorist group other than
Al Qaeda and the Taliban.148 In addition, and in order to ensure
that such financial sanctions do not lead to a counterproductive
undermining of the dollar’s primacy in international financial
transactions, the managers of the leading alternative currency, the
Euro, must become full partners in imposing sanctions against
financiers of terrorism and proliferation.

148
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